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Abstract: 
 
This report provides an overview of hazard rating systems used by competent authorities in various United Nations Economic 
Commission for Europe (UNECE) member countries for prioritising resources and directing attention to chemical hazard sites 
and industries where it is most needed. The report describes each country’s hazard rating system and shows the different uses 
and approaches, without highlighting or making recommendations on a preferred system. The purpose of the report is to give 
UNECE countries insight into various approaches as they seek to establish or modify their systems in the future to support 
effective implementation of chemical accident prevention and preparedness policy. The information provided in this report is 
a summary of the responses received from UNECE countries (as well as one international body) to a survey distributed by the 
UNECE Convention on the Transboundary Effects of Industrial Accidents (Industrial Accidents Convention) and the Major 
Accident Hazards Bureau of the European Commission’s Joint Research Centre. For this reason, this document should be an 
encouraging input to countries which have not yet established their own rating systems but are considering it. 
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Preface 
 
The need for developing a guide on methodologies for hazard rating was identified at the workshop 
on costs-effectiveness for major accident prevention (12 October 2011, Warsaw), organised within 
the framework of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) Convention on the 
Trans-boundary Effects of Industrial Accidents (Industrial Accidents Convention). Moreover, different 
Parties and Beneficiary countries to the Assistance Programme within the Industrial Accidents 
Convention indicated in their reports on implementation for the sixth (2010-2011) and seventh 
(2012-2013) reporting round that the capacity-building in the area of risk-assessment techniques, 
such as accidents hazard rating, is a priority in order to serve as a basis to plan and prioritise 
inspections, taking into account the complexity and extent of the hazards and the compliance history 
of the hazardous activities.  
 
At its seventh meeting (14-16 November 2012, Stockholm), the Conference of the Parties of the 
Industrial Accidents Convention included the development of a guide on methodology for hazard 
rating as one of the priorities into the Convention’s work plan for 2013-14. The Conference of the 
Parties also stipulated that the activity should be accomplished with suitable partners. 
 
The Industrial Accidents Convention’s Bureau identified the Major Accident Hazards Bureau (MAHB) 
of the European Commission’s Joint Research Centre (JRC), in particular, as a possible partner, since 
hazard rating systems and methodologies are also relevant to the work of MAHB, especially in the 
context of the Seveso Directive.  
 
This document was prepared jointly by MAHB and the secretariat of the Industrial Accidents 
Convention, using information on existing systems, practices and methodologies in the area of 
hazard rating, developed and used by EU and UNECE member countries (as well as one international 
body) for ranking major hazard establishments, using, processing or storing hazardous substances. 
The document does not recommend any single methodology nor evaluates or compares the 
methodologies used in the different countries. It is expected to support UNECE countries – in 
particular countries from Eastern and South-Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia – to 
strengthen their capacity in the area of industrial accident prevention and control. 
 
The information about available systems, practices and methodologies for hazard rating could be 
used for planning and prioritising inspections, regulatory purposes, identifying safety performance 
trends or contributing to the development of future policy strategies in the area of accident 
prevention and control. 
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Executive Summary 
This report provides an overview of hazard rating systems used by competent authorities in many 
United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) member countries for prioritising 
resources and directing attention to chemical hazard sites and industries where it is most needed. 
The report describes each country’s hazard rating system and shows the different uses and 
approaches, without highlighting or making recommendations on a preferred system. The purpose 
of the report is to give UNECE countries insight into various approaches as they seek to establish or 
modify their systems in the future to support effective implementation of chemical accident 
prevention and preparedness policy. The information provided in this report is a summary of the 
responses received from UNECE countries (as well as one international body) to a survey distributed 
by the UNECE Convention of the Transboundary effects of Industrial Accidents (Industrial Accidents 
Convention) and the Major Accident Hazards Bureau of the European Commission’s Joint Research 
Centre. 
 
Section 1. Background  
The report is divided into three sections, Background, Findings and Conclusions. The Background 
section explains the growing demand for hazard rating systems to support implementation of 
authority obligations for chemical accident prevention and preparedness legislation, and more 
specifically, the EU Seveso Directive and the UNECE Industrial Accidents Convention. It summarises 
the historic development of such systems, particularly to implement inspections targeting industrial 
establishments where dangerous substances are produced, used or stored in large quantities 
(Seveso establishments). It also explains what is generally meant by a hazard rating system in the 
context of a chemical accident prevention and preparedness programme. It is noted that the 
systems in this study are specifically aimed to rate sites considered hazardous on the basis that they 
process, store or handle dangerous substance in such volumes that release of the substance(s) could 
cause a serious accident onsite or to the surrounding community. 
 
Section 2. Findings 
The Findings section is the core of the document, summarizing the responses of the survey on a wide 
range of aspects pertaining to the development, context, content, methodology, outcomes of the 
methodologies and their application, and accessibility of results as well as the hazard rating 
methodology itself. From this section, users of this report can obtain information on different ways 
to develop methodologies, gain a perspective on both objective and subjective methods that can be 
applied, and also review the specific inputs that have been considered useful for producing a 
credible result across a diverse range of hazardous sites.  
 
In this section a number of commonalities can also be observed, for example, the purpose for which 
the system is used, the types of sites, structural elements (i.e., inputs) of the hazard rating systems. 
Nearly two-thirds of the systems specifically target Seveso sites and the most common inputs are 
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type of hazardous substance, followed by potential risk recipients, and production and process 
conditions. Most outputs are at least partially quantitative, with some systems also producing both a 
quantitative and a qualitative result. 
 
A majority of respondents were willing to share their methodology with other UNECE countries. 
However, the survey responses also noted that most of the methodologies currently exist only in the 
native language. Four methodologies are available in English and two methodologies are available in 
Russian. A handful of the methodologies are supported by online web tools. 
 
More than half of the respondents indicated that they were generally satisfied or very satisfied with 
the methodology and its results. A number of systems had also been modified over time after a few 
years’ experience, which may also have contributed to the relatively positive feedback in this regard 
from several respondents. Likewise, most respondents reported that the systems were easy or 
somewhat easy to use. 
 
Section 3. Conclusions 
The Conclusions section provides a brief summary of the main findings of the study. Common 
elements of the systems are cited, and the strengths and weaknesses of the systems evidenced in 
the survey responses are briefly described. Notably, feedback in regard to the transparency of 
results was mixed as it appears that in many cases the output of the methodology is not entirely 
intuitive and needs to be interpreted by someone who has expert knowledge of the system. 
Nonetheless, more than half of the respondents considered that the results of the rating system 
could possibly be considered appropriate for risk communication to the public. 
 
Annexes 
The annexes contain case studies describing selected hazard ranking systems from the United 
Kingdom, Sweden and Belgium in detail. While the survey responses address different inputs and 
outputs of hazard ranking, the case studies describe entire hazard ranking systems and which inputs 
and outputs have been selected. The case studies describe each hazard ranking system system as a 
whole, and in the context of its purpose and intended use. The input elements, output calculations, 
and uses intended for each system can vary considerably from one country to the next. 
In addition, a copy of the survey is included in an annex. 
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1. Background 
 
1.1. Rationale and objectives of the guide 
 
The development of a guide on hazard rating systems and their methodologies is one of the priority 
objectives of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) Convention on the 
Transboundary Effects of Industrial Accidents (Industrial Accidents Convention). Hazard rating 
methodologies are also relevant to the work of the Major Accidents Hazard Bureau (MAHB) Unit of 
the Joint Research Centre, European Commission; especially in the context of the Seveso II Directive, 
as these hazard rating systems and methodologies could assist in various policy decisions.  
 
1.1.1. The UNECE Industrial Accidents Convention 
 
The UNECE region is historically one of the most industrialised regions of the world. Industrialization, 
coupled with the growth of populations and the development of residential areas near major 
industrial plants and estates, have led to increased risks to human health and the environment 
caused by industrial accidents. Industrial operations may involve substances that do not usually 
represent a great threat to our health or our environment but are nevertheless potentially 
hazardous. In Europe, the well-publicised industrial accidents at Seveso in Italy in 1976 and Basel in 
Switzerland ten years later have brought this message home to us. These accidents, as well as 
disasters in other parts of the world, such as the Bhopal and Mexico City 1984 accidents and the 
more recent accidents in Baia Mare, Toulouse, Buncefield and Kolontar, have caused us to 
acknowledge that industrial accidents do not recognize borders. In addition, the severity of 
consequences is often much higher and more complex when there are a lack of measures in place 
for effective accident prevention, preparedness and response, public information, accident 
notification and mutual assistance in the event of a major accident. 
 
Recognising the challenges ahead for Member States, since the early 1990s the UNECE has 
concentrated its efforts on preventing industrial accidents and especially their transboundary effects 
in the region. Its work has led to the adoption of the Convention on the Transboundary Effects of 
Industrial Accidents on 17 March 1992. The Convention was signed by 26 UNECE member countries 
and the European Union (EU) and entered into force on 19 April 2000. Currently there are 41 
Members to the Convention, including the EU. Following the Convention's entry into force, the 
UNECE carries out the secretariat functions for the Convention. 
 
The Convention aims at protecting human beings and the environment against industrial accidents 
by preventing such accidents as far as possible, by reducing their frequency and severity and by 
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mitigating their effects. It promotes active international cooperation between the Parties, before, 
during and after an industrial accident. 
 
1.1.2. The Seveso II Directive  
 
The Seveso accident in 1976 also prompted the adoption of EU legislation aimed at the prevention 
and control of such accidents. The resulting Seveso Directive now applies to around 10,000 industrial 
establishments in the European Union where dangerous substances are used or stored in large 
quantities, mainly in the chemicals, petrochemicals, storage, and metal refining sectors. The Seveso 
Directive (currently Directive 96/82/EC to be replaced 1 June 2015 with Directive 2012/18/EU) 
obliges EU Member States to ensure that operators have a policy in place to prevent major 
accidents. Operators handling dangerous substances above certain thresholds must regularly inform 
the public likely to be affected by an accident, prepare safety reports, have a safety management 
system in place and an internal emergency plan developed. EU Member States must also ensure that 
external emergency plans are in place for the surrounding areas and that mitigation actions are 
planned. Land-use planning must also take into account the potential risks of major hazard 
establishments. 
 
Since the European Union’s 28 Member States form an important part of the UNECE region, 
provisions of the Industrial Accidents Convention and the Seveso Directive share the same principles. 
Moreover, the Seveso III Directive is considered as the legal and technical instrument for fulfilling 
the obligations of the European Community arising out of the Industrial Accidents Convention to 
which the EU is a Party. The synergies between the two legislative instruments makes collaboration 
between the European Union, its Member States and the UNECE particularly advantageous and has 
resulted in a number of joint activities over the years in the form of emergency response exercises, 
training and technical tools and reference materials. This particular study represents one such 
collaboration and has been created through the joint contribution of UNECE and the European 
Commission’s Major Accident Hazards Bureau (MAHB) with the support of the Directorate-General 
for the Environment of the EU. 
 
1.1.3. History of hazard ranking systems applied to major hazard sites 
 
Risk governance of chemical hazard sites became an important focus of government policy in 
developed regions of the world about 30 years ago, about the same time that the EU’s Seveso 
Directive became law in 12 European Member States. Since then there has always been a portion of 
government resources devoted to the development, study, and dissemination of methods to assess 
risks of industrial hazards on individual sites. More recently, authorities are giving attention to 
evaluation of site risks from a relative standpoint, as a way of prioritising resources and directing 
attention to industries and sites where it is most needed.  
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The Seveso II Directive (96/82/EC) first introduced a legal basis for hazard rating systems in 1996, 
through a provision under Article 18 to apply a systematic appraisal system to prioritise the 
inspection of Seveso upper tier sites in lieu of conducting an inspection of each of these sites 
automatically once a year. Over the years, since the Seveso II Directive came into law, several EU 
Member States have taken on board this concept, often rating not only their upper tier sites but all 
Seveso sites, to produce an overall prioritisation of all Seveso sites for inspection. The system 
rationalizes the enforcement of safety measure, such as more frequent inspection of sites that are 
perceived to have more significant safety challenges. This helps to address risk situations that need 
on-going attention from authorities to ensure that they are monitored and addressed in due time. 
The hazard rating system is not a justification for foregoing inspections or extending the interval 
between inspections to several years. 
 
Outside the Seveso regime, a few other regional hazard rating systems for similar types of hazards 
are known to exist, although their application is not particularly wide spread. For example, the 
survey conducted for this study received a set of responses relating to a rating system developed to 
support environmental protection of the Danube River. This relatively new system was developed 
exclusively to manage risks associated with water pollution, including determining alert thresholds in 
case of a high volume substance release into water, as well as identifying accident risk spots in river 
basins. There also appears to be significant interest in risk mapping systems for developed countries 
that tend to have incomplete data on their hazard sites but methods in development are still largely 
untested. In any case, it is not yet clear to what extent risk mapping techniques will aid authorities in 
prioritising interventions between sites. They may complement risk rating systems by showing 
where clusters of risk are located in relation to dense populations and natural hazards, for example. 
 
More recently, Seveso countries are looking at systems for evaluating the effectiveness of risk 
management measures on industrial hazard sites. This type of rating system is relatively new and 
only a few countries are in the process of implementing such a system, so feedback from that 
experience is still somewhat limited. The survey also received a set of responses on one such system, 
newly developed by Belgium, and featured as a case study in Annex 1. 
 
1.1.4. Objectives of the study report and expected users 
 
The purpose of this study was to collect and disseminate information on existing practices and 
methodologies in the area of hazard rating methodologies, developed and used by EU Member 
States, UNECE member countries. This document reports the findings from the study. The document 
does not recommend any single methodology nor does it evaluate or compare the methodologies 
used in the different countries subjectively. Rather, on the basis of information provided from 
several UNECE member countries (and one international body), it draws attention to various models 
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used in current practice as a mechanism to help authorities develop their own systems or 
benchmark their existing practice. As such, the document is intended to share rating system 
approaches and methodologies and to support UNECE countries, authorities and organisations to 
strengthen their capacity for industrial accident prevention and control. 
 
Hazard rating systems are generally used to optimise use of resources of competent authorities and 
to measure and direct the influence of established chemical accident prevention policy. As such they 
may be developed to support policy development and implementation in a number of ways. Most 
commonly, in EU Member States they have been applied to assist planning and prioritising of 
inspections. Recently, some hazard rating systems have also been applied to evaluate the 
effectiveness of enforcement actions and other interventions. Hazard rating systems can also be 
used for regulatory purposes (review and assessment of safety reports, issuing of permits or 
consents, etc.), identification of safety performance trends, and for development of future policy 
strategies in the area of accident prevention and control. 
 
The primary users are expected to consist of Seveso and UNECE Industrial Accidents competent and 
enforcement authorities. Operators may also find the document useful when developing, 
implementing or updating their management systems for industrial accident prevention and control. 
 
1.1.5. Definition and characteristics of a hazard rating system 
 
For the purposes of this document a hazard rating methodology is a system for estimating the major 
accident hazard potential of an industrial site that processes, handles or stores dangerous 
substances. Its purpose is to assist competent authorities in strategy development, and planning and 
prioritising of interventions in support of chemical accident prevention and preparedness policy. The 
output following application of the method may be relative (functioning only as a way to compare 
the site to other sites) or absolute (a ranking of risk independent from other sites). In the latter case, 
a certain level of scientific rigour is required to structure the method so that its results can be 
interpreted independently without reference to the risk indicated for other sites.   
 
A hazard rating system for major accident hazards is distinct from other types of hazard assessment 
methods in the following ways: 
 Its focus is on ranking hazard sources. In the case of this document, the sources are industrial 
sites. 
 The hazard sources targeted are those sites that process, store or handle dangerous 
substances in such volumes that a release of the substance(s) could cause a serious accident 
onsite or to the surrounding community or region, including transboundary impacts. 
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The system should take into account the intrinsic hazards, that is, the substance(s) and their 
dangerous properties and typical quantities on site, as well as external hazards (e.g., potential 
natural hazards affecting the site) and vulnerabilities (population, public buildings, natural resources, 
etc.). 
 
Hazard rating is not a substitute for risk assessment. Risk assessments are typically technically 
exercises in which particular methodologies are applied to a specific site to identify precise nature of 
hazards, establish potential accident scenarios, and predict possible consequences, with the view to 
defining a detailed risk management strategy of the site. A risk assessment is a site-specific activity 
whose inputs and methodical approach are uniquely determined by the individual characteristics of 
a site. 
 
1.1.6. Typical components and outputs of hazard rating systems 
 
Hazard rating systems can be based on both objective and subjective components. Typical 
components include: 
 Hazardous substances present (e.g., quantities, properties, etc.) 
 A standardised hazard rating methodology (e.g., MOND Index, Dow FE&I, etc.) 
 Regulatory status (if any) in relation to the hazard 
 Size of the site (e.g., number of employee, production volume, etc.) 
 Production or process conditions  
 Inspection records/compliance history or enforcement record 
 Enforcement record (e.g., penalties and other legal interventions, etc.) 
 Accident and near miss history 
 Natural phenomena that could lead to an accident 
 Possible risk recipients (e.g., residential areas, public facilities, natural resources, etc.) 
 
Depending on the information available, the system may also use information from the operator 
(e.g., supplied in the safety reports) on installations design, maintenance practice, age of the 
operation, operator audit or self-assessment, safety performance indicators and safety culture 
measurements. The systems may be designed to produce either a qualitative or quantitative 
evaluation. A number of methods for combining inputs are also possible. Some systems may 
quantify all inputs to produce one output. Some systems may weight different inputs before 
summarising them with others. There also may be separate categories that are not added together 
but viewed separately and then weighed against each other (e.g., intrinsic hazard vs. potential 
consequences of an accident). Experience with good practice suggests that many different 
approaches may be considered valid, but it is important that the method for producing the final 
rating is both logical and transparent. 
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1.2. Project methodology 
 
The current document was developed after conducting a bilingual (English and Russian) survey on 
hazard rating methodologies used by EU and UNECE member countries for the prioritisation and 
evaluation of hazardous establishments. The survey aims to elicit information about available hazard 
ranking systems targeted any type of evaluation used for ranking or evaluating such establishments.  
 
In particular, the survey aimed at obtaining information on the following: 
• Hazard rating and ranking methodologies used for inspections (such as ‘systematic appraisal’ 
that can be used to prioritise Seveso inspections); 
• Methodologies that rate individual sites for the purposes of tracking overall policy effectiveness 
or safety performance or trends on major hazard sites or other similar purposes. 
 
The survey was designed by MAHB in collaboration with the secretariat of the UNECE Convention on 
the Transboundary Effects of Industrial Accidents. In January 2014, the survey was distributed for 
completion by the by representatives of the competent authorities nominated for the 
implementation of the EU Seveso Directive and the UNECE Convention on Transboundary Effects of 
Industrial Accidents. For countries in the EU as well as the European Economic Areas (EEA) and the 
European Free Trade Association (EFTA), the request to complete the survey was also copied to the 
representatives of the Technical Working Group on Seveso Inspections. In total, the survey was 
distributed to total 48 countries including 28 EU Member States, three EEA/EFTA1 countries and 17 
other countries covered by the UNECE Industrial Accidents Convention. 
 
The survey focused on gaining understanding on the methodology or system used, how it is applied, 
what kind of outcomes are expected, and how results are used. The respondents could submit more 
than one set of survey responses, if more than one hazard rating system applies to major hazard 
sites in that country. However, it was required that each hazard rating system would be the subject 
of a separate survey. It was also explained to potential respondents that the system could be 
relevant for any major hazard sites or for a subset of sites in the country. Respondents could also 
describe hazard rating systems that covered a broader range of substances (not only acute chemical 
hazards) that are outside the scope of Seveso or the Industrial Accidents Convention (e.g., sites 
below the Seveso lower tier), but that are focused on chemical accident prevention. Methodologies 
                                                          
1
 Iceland and Norway belong to the European Economic Area (EEA). Members of the EEA must implement all 
European community legislation relevant to trade and therefore, implement the Seveso Directive along with 
EU Member States. Together with EU Member States, these countries are all Seveso-implementing countries. 
Switzerland belongs to the European Free Trade Area and implements chemical accident prevention policy 
that has many similarities with the Seveso Directive.  
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or systems that cover a subset of chemical hazard based on other criteria, e.g., establishments at risk 
for environmental accidents, were also of interest for the survey. 
 
The survey (see Annex 2) contained the following six main groups of questions: 
- Respondent organisation’s details 
- Summary description of the system or methodology  
- Structure and outputs of the system or methodology  
- Availability and access to the system or methodology 
- Strengths and weaknesses of the system or methodology, and  
- Background materials. 
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2. Findings 
 
2.1. General overview of responses and respondents 
 
In order to obtain a comprehensive understanding about the existing hazard ranking systems, EU 
and UNECE member countries were requested to complete the on-line survey form (see Annex 2). 
For this purpose, the survey was distributed to a total of 48 countries in the Economic Commission 
for Europe region including 28 EU Member States, three EEA/EFTA countries and 17 non 
EU/EEA/EFTA UNECE member countries. This section summarises the overall response rate to the 
survey, the geographical location of the respondents, and the organizations or authorities that the 
respondent is representing.  
 
2.1.1. By response rate 
 
Out of the 48 countries targeted, nine EU Member States and seven non-EU countries responded to 
the survey (33%). Of the non-EU countries, two countries belong to the EEA/EFTA category, one is 
from South-Eastern Europe, two are from Eastern Europe and two others are from the Caucasus and 
Central Asia. Notably, one EU Member State (Belgium) provided two sets of survey responses for 
two different hazard rating systems applied to the country’s major hazard sites. In addition, a 
respondent from Germany responded on behalf of the rating system used by the International River 
Commissions of the Danube, Elbe and Odra Rivers. The number of countries solicited versus those 
that responded to the survey are listed in Table 1. 
 
Table 1: UNECE countries requested and their responses (per region) 
N=18 
 
Category Requested  Responses  Respondents 
EU 28 10 
Belgium (LOPI), Belgium (RTT), Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech 
Republic, Finland, Germany, Poland, Sweden, United 
Kingdom 
EEA/EFTA 3 2 Norway, Switzerland 
Outside EU    
South-Eastern 
Europe 
5 1 
Serbia 
Eastern Europe 4 2 Republic of Moldova, Ukraine 
Caucasus  3  1  Armenia 
Central Asia 5 1 Kyrgyzstan 
International 
 
1 
International River Commissions of the Danube, Elbe 
and Odra Rivers 
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In general, the quality of the responses received was very high. Eighteen (18) respondents 
completed the survey and provided the requested information; however, a few surveys were 
submitted with incomplete responses. Two respondents mentioned that they did not yet have a 
system. One of these respondents (Norway) provided responses on the basis of expectations for 
their new system and those when relevant are included in the analysis. The other respondent 
(Kyrgyzstan) did not specially indicate in its responses about its expectations for the new system, and 
therefore, its response is not considered for the analysis. Among the 18 respondents, a few 
respondents only replied to some of the questions. For this reason, responses to several questions 
are less than 18.  
 
Nevertheless, a diverse range of social, political and infrastructure factors were observed amongst 
the respondents’ country profiles (as well as the region covered by in the international body), in 
particular, in regard to the following perspectives: 
 Politically – Both EU and non-EU countries responded to the survey. 
 Population size – The population size of respondent countries ranged between three and 80 
million inhabitants. 
 Number of Seveso sites (EU only) – The number of Seveso sites in each respondent country 
ranged from nearly 200 to over 2000, based on the most recent SPIRS2 data. 
 
2.1.2. By geographic range  
 
The majority of the responses (67%) were provided by the northern and western European 
countries, and less responses were received by the South-Eastern and Eastern European countries 
and Central Asia (28%). One response was on behalf of the International River Commissions of the 
Danube, Elbe and Odra Rivers. 
 
2.1.3. By competent authorities 
 
The respondents identified the organisation with which they were affiliated. These responses are 
summarized in Table 2 according to their area of competence (e.g. environment, civil protection, 
employment and labour, industrial safety, etc.). It can be noted that majority of the respondents are 
associated with organisations dealing with environmental issues (seven countries).  
  
                                                          
2
 EU and EEA countries are required to report their inventory of Seveso sites to the European Commission’s 
Seveso establishments reporting system (SPIRS).  
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Table 2: Main competences of responding organisations  
Competence Organisations  
Environment   Ministry of Environment and Water - Bulgaria 
 Ministry of the Environment - Czech Republic 
 Ministry of Environment and Nature Protection - Croatia 
 Federal Environment Agency (Umweltbundesamt) - Germany 
 Chief Inspectorate for Environmental Protection – Poland  
 Darmstadt Regional Council, Occupational Safety and Environment 
(Regierungspräsidium Darmstadt Abt. Arbeitsschutz und Umwelt) - Germany 
 Federal Office for the Environment, Major Accident and Earthquake 
Mitigation Section - Switzerland  
 Ministry of Energy, Development and Environmental Protection – Serbia 
Civil 
Protection 
 Norwegian Directorate for Civil Protection - Norway 
 Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency – Sweden 
 Ministry of Emergency Response – Armenia 
 The State Emergency Response Service - Ukraine 
Employment 
and Labour 
 Federal Public Service Employment, Labour and Social Dialogue - Belgium 
 Darmstadt Regional Council, Occupational Safety and Environment 
(Regierungspräsidium Darmstadt Abt. Arbeitsschutz und Umwelt) - Germany*  
 Health and Safety Executive – United Kingdom (UK) 
Industrial 
Safety 
 Finnish Safety and Chemicals Agency – Finland  
 Secretary of National Group for Implementation of the Industrial Accidents 
Convention – Republic of Moldova 
Other  The Intersectoral Training Centre under the State Agency for Geology and 
Mineral Resources – Kyrgyzstan 
N =17 
*Also listed as a competent authority in environmental affairs. 
 
2.2. Summary of descriptions of hazard rating systems surveyed 
 
This section summarises the survey responses to gain an understanding of the structure of each 
hazard rating system and their similarities (if any) between various systems. For this purpose, each 
system was analysed from different perspectives in regard to availability, purpose, scope, 
development, owner, user community, legal status, age, as well as their structure and output. In the 
following sections, a brief overview of each of these aspects of the systems is presented with 
substantial facts and figures as derived.  
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2.2.1. Name of the hazard rating systems 
 
Eight respondents, including two responses from Belgium and one on behalf of an international 
body, confirmed the existence of a hazard rating system in their respective countries (see Table 3 
below). Seven respondents did not provide a name for their system, and three respondents 
(Norway, Republic of Moldova and Kyrgyzstan) did not provide the name because development and 
implementation of the system had not been completed. Kyrgyzstan provided responses to other 
questions in the survey on the basis of the system that was previously used but no longer active. 
 
Table 3: Name of the hazard rating system  
Respondent3 Name 
Belgium Rapid Ranking Technique (RRT) 
Belgium Level of Protection Indicators (LOPI) 
Bulgaria Hazard rating methodology 
Germany Major Hazard Enforcement Guide (Vollzugshandbuch Störfall) (Hessen)  
International Water Risk Index (WRI) 
Poland Multi-criteria risk analysis 
Serbia Rulebook on the Scope of Accident Prevention Policy and Scope and 
Methodology of the Safety Report and Contingency Plan and Development  
United Kingdom 
 
 
Control of Major Accident Hazards (COMAH) Competent Authority: Site 
Prioritisation Methodology, Intrinsic Hazard (Safety and Environment) and 
Performance 
N = 8 
 
The Republic of Moldova indicated that it did not yet have a hazard rating system, but it is in 
development. The intention is to develop such a system for implementation of the inspection 
requirements of the Seveso Directive. At present, Republic of Moldova uses separate rating systems 
for inspections conducted by the various inspectorates associated with different ministries with 
responsibilities associated with chemical accident prevention and preparedness. The civil protection 
authority uses a hazard rating system to assign one of four levels of risk4, based on the number of 
population exposed to the risk.  
                                                          
3
 Sweden, Norway, Czech Republic and Switzerland skipped this question.  
4
 Four levels of risk:  
Class I   - The possible chemical contamination includes more than 75 thousand people; 
Class II  - The possible chemical contamination includes from 40 till 75 thousand people; 
Class III - The possible chemical contamination includes less 40 thousand people. 
Class IV - The possible chemical contamination does not exceed the limits of the object and the protection of   
health. 
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2.2.2. Purpose of the hazard rating system 
 
A hazard rating system may be used for a number of different purposes, such as scheduling an 
inspection, evaluating the effectiveness of the enforcement or the performance of operator on an 
individual basis, etc. Hence, the survey asked respondents to identify the purpose of their hazard 
rating system, the responses to which are presented in Figure 1.  
 
 
Figure 1: Purpose of the hazard rating system (N=17) 
 
Several respondents provided more than one purpose in their response (see Figure 2). Inspection 
scheduling and evaluating the performance of individual operators were most commonly cited by 
respondents (10 or 59% and 9 or 53%, respectively), followed by deciding on the themes for future 
inspections (7 or 41%), and evaluating effectiveness of the enforcement (6 or 35%). Six (35%) 
respondents also cited planning future policy strategy, and four (24%) cited identifying safety trends 
and similarly, prioritizing other interventions.  
 
Belgium has two systems with two different purposes. The Belgian Level of Protection Indicators 
(LOPI) system aims to evaluate individual operator performance while the Rapid Ranking Technique 
(RRT) system is intended for scheduling inspections. Moreover, the Belgian LOPI system is also used 
for deciding on themes of future inspections, for evaluating effectiveness of the enforcement, for 
planning future policy strategy as well as for identifying safety performance trends. Similarly, the 
Czech Republic system and the International Water Risk Index (henceforth WRI) system are also 
used for more than one purpose (as indicated in Figure 2). 
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According to some respondents, the system is also used for other purposes in addition to those cited 
explicitly above. For example, Poland also applies the system to carry out a multi-criteria analysis of 
environmental impacts and hazards posed by the establishment. The results eventually serve as a 
basis to determine the frequency of inspection and accordingly divide entities into five categories5. 
 
 
Figure 2: Different purposes for implementing a hazard rating system in various countries (N=17) 
                                                          
5
 Five categories: 
Category I (highest risk): Annual inspection for the entities that must be inspected due to the legal 
requirements (e.g., upper-tier establishments etc.).  
Category II (high risk): Biannual inspection for the entities that must be inspected due to the legal 
requirements (e.g., lower-tier establishments, activities classified as having always a significant impact on 
environment, entities that don’t meet the environmental requirements etc.).  
Category III (average risk): Inspection every three years or less often for the entities that pose a hazard of 
major accident (not classified as upper tier or lower tier establishment). 
Category IV (low risk): Inspection every four years or less often other than category I, II and III, that are obliged 
to obtain environmental permits, selected as a result of multi-criteria risk assessment.  
Category V: Inspection every five years Facilities that do not require environmental permits, not covered by 
annual planning, without allocated inspection frequency, inspection upon request for intervention. 
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In the case of the International WRI system, the system is used to determine warning and alert 
thresholds in the event of a water accident involving dangerous substances as well as for identifying 
accident risk spots at river basins. Serbia commented that its system may also be used for the 
purposes of emergency planning and land-use planning. Norway also commented that, to date, they 
do not have a hazard rating system in place, but the country has started a project looking into 
possible indicators for the development of risk level in and around Seveso establishments and 
expects to develop a system in future. 
 
2.2.3. Scope of the hazard rating system or methodology 
 
Similar to the purpose, the scope of the hazard rating system also varied considerably between the 
respondents. The survey uses the term ‘scope’ to mean the type or kind of the establishment that 
the system covers and also any legal requirements it supports. It is noted that the system of one 
particular country (or region, in the case of the international body) might cover various kinds of 
establishments (i.e., upper and lower tier Seveso sites), while others may cover different legislative 
mandates. For this reason, the legal requirements governing a particular system may differ from one 
country to another. In the following section, the scope of hazard rating systems used by different 
respondents is discussed. 
 
2.2.3.1. Establishments covered 
 
The hazard rating system applied by the different respondents is usually used in association with the 
particular legal status of a hazardous establishment within the country. Thus it can be understood 
that the establishments under the Seveso Directive are a point of particular interest for the Seveso-
implementing countries. Several non-EU countries might also be working towards Seveso 
implementation with the expectation of joining the EU in future, and depending on what point they 
have reached, Seveso might also be their point of reference. Outside of this possibility, however, it 
can be assumed that a common legislative reference point for non-Seveso UNECE countries could be 
establishments covered by the UNECE Industrial Accidents Convention. It could also be that the 
system is applied only to specific economic activities (e.g., refineries) or to sites classified under 
other legislation apart from the Seveso Directive and UNECE Industrial Accidents Convention. 
 
It can be noted from Figure 3 (see below) that half of the Seveso implementing respondents (10 out 
of 20 including the two Belgian systems) created their hazard rating system mainly for Seveso 
establishments. Notably, Bulgaria and Serbia identified only the upper tier Seveso sites as the scope 
of their systems (see Table 4 below). Nonetheless, none of the respondents from Seveso-
implementing countries indicated that the hazard ranking system was targeted to lower tier sites 
only. This situation can be attributed to the existence of a provision in the Seveso Directive allowing 
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the authority to use a systematic appraisal system for planning inspections of upper tier sites if the 
authority prefers not to inspect each upper tier site every year on an automatic basis. 
 
Some respondents have also identified the establishments classified by other legislations as coming 
into the scope of their hazard rating system. For instance, in Finland, the establishments evaluated 
by the hazard rating system are covered by the Finnish National Legislation have a wider scope than 
the Seveso Directive (including also the establishments with volumes of substances below the 
Seveso lower tier thresholds).  
 
In Poland, all establishments registered in the database of the Inspection of Environmental 
Protection (IEP), are also part of their system. The frequency of the inspection of the Seveso sites is 
fixed at once a year for upper tier sites and once in every two years for lower tier sites. Switzerland 
mentioned that it has lower thresholds quantities than the Seveso Directive and/or the UNECE 
Industrial Accidents Convention. Therefore, the country has relatively more establishments falling in 
the scope of the hazard rating system used for inspection procedures. Besides, facilities representing 
water accident hazards are also considered as covered by the scope of the International WRI system. 
 
Norway mentioned that, when its system is in effect, it could also be used for smaller sites whose 
quantities of dangerous substances are below Seveso thresholds. 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Types of establishments covered by the hazard rating systems in percentage (N=20) 
Specific economic 
activities (5%) 
Sites covered by the 
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Table 4: Types of establishments covered in countries 
Establishments Responses Respondent 
All Seveso sites 10 Belgium (LOPI), Belgium (RRT), Bulgaria, Croatia, 
Czech Republic, Finland, Germany, Norway, 
Sweden, United Kingdom 
Upper tier Seveso sites only 2 Bulgaria, Serbia 
Sites classified by other 
legislation 
2 Finland, Norway 
Only sites covered by the 
UNECE Industrial Accidents 
Convention 
2 Kyrgyzstan, Ukraine 
Specific economic activities 1 Republic of Moldova6 
Lower tier Seveso sites only 0 None 
Other 3 International (WRI), Poland, Switzerland 
N=20 
 
2.2.3.2. Legal framework and application 
 
Generally, the application of a particular hazard rating system varies depending on the legal 
framework of a country. As shown in Table 5 (see below), the majority of EU Member States apply 
the hazard rating system in the context of the Seveso Directive. An analysis of the responses in this 
regard highlights the fact that 10 of the existing systems are associated with the implementation of 
all operator requirements under the Seveso Directive. Six respondents specifically apply (or applied, 
in the case of Kyrgyzstan) the hazard rating system in context of the implementation of the UNECE 
Industrial Accidents Convention in addition to the Seveso Directive. 
 
The Belgian LOPI system currently consists of questions relating to 26 specific process safety 
measures. The intention of the rating system is to document whether such measures are in place or 
not for each company. The evaluation is based on inspection results as interpreted for each of the 26 
measures; since the measures are very specific and are not exhaustive. Complying with the 26 
measures or LOPI does not imply any particular level of compliance with the Seveso Directive, but it 
gives a good indication. The Seveso inspection authorities check many more measures than the 26 
LOPIs but the LOPIs are evaluated and analysed statistically. 
 
In response to other themes in addition to the Seveso Directive and/or the UNECE Industrial 
Accidents Convention, the respondent representing the International WRI system mentioned that 
                                                          
6
 All activities involving dangerous substances  
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the classification of water accident risks, associated with legislation other than Seveso, also comes 
under the scope of their WRI system. In this regard, Finland pointed out that the rating system was 
also applied in the context of technical requirements based on the National Safety Decrees. In 
Poland, all establishments covered by the Control System of inspection that must be inspected are 
covered by the system. Republic of Moldova mentioned that the proposal of the system is intending 
to cover the requirements covered by both the Seveso Directive and the UNECE Industrial Accidents 
Convention. 
 
Table 5: Link of the rating system with legislative requirements (by respondent) 
Requirements Responses Respondents 
All operator requirements under the 
Seveso Directive 
10 Belgium (RRT), Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech 
Republic, Finland, Germany, Serbia, Sweden, 
Switzerland, United Kingdom 
All operator requirements under the 
UNECE Industrial Accidents 
Convention 
6 Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, 
Kyrgyzstan, Serbia, Switzerland 
Some operator requirements under 
the Seveso Directive 
1 Belgium (LOPI) 
Other themes in addition to the 
Seveso Directive and/or the UNECE 
Industrial Accidents Convention 
requirements 
5 Finland, International (WRI), Norway, 
Poland, Switzerland  
N=15 
 
2.2.4. Development of the system 
 
Hazard rating systems have been developed in a variety of ways, according to the various 
respondents. In some cases the system was subject to results of a specific research project or based 
on the existing system or methodology as developed by other authorities or countries. Some 
authorities developed their systems with the support of a special committee or a consultant. 
 
The responses show (see Table 6 and Figure 4 below) that according to half of the respondents (8 or 
50%), the existing system was developed in collaboration with a special committee or task force. In 
contrast, several other respondents (4 or 25%) confirmed that the system was based on another 
existing hazard rating system conceptualised by another authority, or even another country. For 
instance, in Poland, the hazard rating system was developed under the project entitled “Increasing 
effectiveness of the Environmental Inspection”; while in the Republic of Moldova the system 
developed for the Former Soviet countries is still operational. Similarly, the Belgian RRT system was 
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developed by the TNO in the Netherlands based on the Dow Fire and Explosion Index7. In the Czech 
Republic, the system was developed based on the system of the UK Health and Safety Executive 
(HSE) and TNO methodology. 
 
Norway also indicated that it is preparing its methodology based on inputs from other countries and 
being assisted by the Norwegian research institute, SINTEF. Norway has studied both the UK and 
Finnish systems in particular and it could be that its future methodology is a further development of 
both.  
 
Furthermore, respondent representing the International River Commissions mentioned that the WRI 
hazard rating system was developed based on Annex VI of the Seveso Directive as adapted to river 
accidents. The system is based on the transposition of substances present that could lead to water 
pollution into WRC (in German language WGK) 3-equivalents (water risk classes). From the sum of 
the WRC 3- equivalents a so-called WRI (i.e., Water Risk Index) can be calculated logarithmically, 
analogous to the Richter scale in the case of earthquakes. On this basis, it is possible to analyse the 
potential accidental risk spots, i.e. in the Danube catchment area and assess their relative 
significance as well as to set threshold values for activating international Warning and Alert System.  
 
Table 6: Various ways used to develop the system in respondent countries 
Development Responses Respondents 
Supported by a special 
committee or task force  
8 (50%) Belgium (LOPI), Bulgaria, Croatia, Germany, 
Serbia, Switzerland, Ukraine, United Kingdom 
Based on an existing system of 
another authority or country 
4 (25%) Belgium (RRT), Czech Republic, Republic of 
Moldova, Poland 
Other  4 (25%) Finland, International (WRI), Norway, Sweden  
N=16 
  
                                                          
7
 Published by the International Labour office (ILO) as Major Hazard Control, a practical manual (ISBN 92-2-
106432-8),1988 
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Figure 4: Various ways used to develop the system in respondent countries (N=16) 
 
In Sweden the method was developed through various exchange of experience in workshops and 
conferences related to Seveso inspections. In Finland, the system began first as an indicator to assist 
in evaluating the influence of the authority's work as well as to associate a level of safety associated 
with the site based on inspectors' professional judgement.  
 
Notably, no respondent indicated that its system was developed as a result of a specific research 
project or based on information found in scientific literature.  
 
2.2.5. Users of the hazard rating methodologies 
 
As indicated in Table 7, national authorities were most often cited as the main user of the hazard 
rating system. For at least three respondents, the main users were regional competent authorities. 
For one system, national and regional authorities were both cited as users and in another case the 
operator was also mentioned as a user. However, the international WRI system is used by the 
countries that belong to the International River Basin Convention.  
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Table 7: Users of the system 
Respondents Users  
Belgium (LOPI) The Seveso Inspection Authority of the Federal Public Service Employment, 
Labour and Social Dialogue (Department for the Supervision of Chemical 
Risks)  
Belgium (RRT) Federal Labour Inspectorate Competent for Seveso inspections; the resulting 
minimum inspection frequency is used for the inspection programme of all 
competent regional and federal Seveso inspection authorities  
Bulgaria Regional Inspectorates for Environment and Water 
Croatia Environmental Ministry Inspectorate 
Czech Republic Competent Authority, Operator 
Finland National Competent Authority - Finnish Safety and Chemicals Agency 
Germany The Hessian Competent Authority for Seveso inspections 
International 
(WRI) 
International River Commissions  
Kyrgyzstan The Competent Authority 
Republic of 
Moldova 
The Emergency Department is using the old system based on the number of 
the population exposed 
Norway National Competent Authority 
Poland Inspection for Environmental Protection (one of the national competent 
authorities)  
Serbia  National Competent Authorities 
Sweden County Administrative Board (Regional level) 
Switzerland Cantonal Competent Authorities who are responsible for the enforcement of 
the Swiss Major Accident Ordinance (MAO) with chemical establishments. 
Ukraine The State Service for Mining Supervision and Industrial Safety 
United 
Kingdom 
National Competent Authority (i.e., regulatory body for COMAH Regulations 
1999 which includes the Health and Safety Executive and respective 
Environment Agencies of England, Scotland and Wales). 
N=17 
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2.2.6. Legal status of the hazard rating methodologies 
 
According to the survey, half of those who responded (8 out of 16) said that the hazard rating 
system is formally part of national legislation (refer to Figure 5). The remaining eight systems are not 
legally binding but in some cases a system has been adopted as official guidance (albeit voluntary). 
For example, the German system is adopted by an official committee of industry and authority 
representatives.  
 
In the UK, the system is not mentioned in any legislation but developed as Competent Authority 
guidance and published on the HSE website. In Switzerland, the cantons can apply the instrument 
voluntarily. (There are some cantons that have other rating systems.) Implementation of a hazard 
rating system is legally required for the enforcement of the Swiss Major Accident Ordinance. 
 
 
   Figure 5: Status of formal adaptation into the legal requirements (N=16) 
 
2.2.7. Age of the systems 
 
It can be noted from Figure 6 and Table 8 below that, amongst the respondents, the hazard rating 
system has evolved over different time periods. Four respondents have a long tradition (more than 
20 years) of using a hazard rating system. On the other hand, one respondent has been using its 
system for less than three years. However, almost half of the respondents (7 or 47%) have had a 
system in place from three to 10 years. Table 8 shows the number of years (as a range) for which the 
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respondents have been operating their hazard rating system. The Republic of Moldova8 and 
Kyrgyzstan did not specify the age of the system but both mentioned that it is an old system. In one 
country (Norway), the system has not yet been applied.  
 
 
            Figure 6: Number of systems distributed by different age groups (N=15) 
 
           Table 8: Age of the systems 
Age (Years) Respondents 
1 to 2 Belgium (LOPI)  
3 to 5 Poland, Serbia, United Kingdom 
6 to 10 Bulgaria, Croatia, Finland, Germany 
11 to 15 Czech Republic, Sweden , Ukraine 
16 to 20 Armenia, Belgium (RRT), International (WRI), 
Switzerland9 
             N=15 
 
In the UK, the previous methodologies for developing the hazard rating systems were based on basic 
ratings and rankings of safety. The UK’s current methodology was incorporates a wider range of 
environmental considerations and site performance issues.  
 
  
                                                          
8
 Used by Emergency Situations Department for forecasting the scale of the accident and calculate the human 
resources and capacities for the liquidation of the accident in case if it will happen.  
9
 In Switzerland the obligation to use a hazard rating system for organizing inspections (the system described 
here or another system) has been in force for around 2 years. 
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2.2.8. Structure and outputs of the hazard rating systems 
 
To understand the structure and the output pattern of the system, the respondents were asked 
which authority conducts as well as contributes to the rating exercise, how often the exercise is 
conducted, what the structural elements of the system are, how the data are evaluated, in which 
format the result of the system is available and which authority is provided with the result. In the 
following sections, each of these aspects is discussed explicitly.  
 
2.2.8.1. Authority performing (conducting) the hazard rating exercise 
 
The responses confirmed that for the majority of the systems (8 or 57%), the respondent (as an 
authority) lead the hazard rating exercise (as shown in Figure 7 and Table 9). Norway confirmed that 
its system would also adopt this approach once it is in place. However, it was noted that the 
respondent is not always the authority involved in performing the entire hazard rating exercise. For 
example, two respondents (14%) said that other authorities (i.e., not the respondent), perform the 
hazard rating exercise. In Sweden, it is the County Administrative Board. In Czech Republic, the 
authorities involved in the process can provide input but the regional competent authority is 
responsible for summarising these contributions.  
 
 
    Figure 7: Authority conducting the hazard rating exercise (N=14) 
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Table 9: Authority conducting the hazard rating exercises in different respondent countries 
Authorities Responses Respondents 
Respondent’s authority leads 
the hazard rating exercise 
8 (57%) Belgium (RRT), Belgium (LOPI), Bulgaria, 
Finland, Germany, Poland, Serbia, United 
Kingdom 
Another authority leads the 
hazard rating exercise 
2 (14%) Czech Republic, Sweden 
Other authorities evaluate 
the data 
0 None 
Other authorities contribute 
the data 
0 None 
Other 4 (29%)  International (WRI), Kyrgyzstan, Norway, 
Switzerland 
N=14 
 
The UK pointed out that the competent authority reviews the scores annually. And the overall 
ranking is shared and used in a combined competent authority planning exercise. Switzerland 
mentioned that the cantons conduct the inspections. With the supervision of the Major Accident 
Ordinance (MAO), Federal Office of the Environment verifies whether the hazard rating exercise has 
been carried out in a harmonised way. For the international WRI system it is the International River 
Commission. Ukraine mentioned that an economic actor that owns or operates at least one 
potentially hazardous facility or intends to launch the construction of such a facility may identify the 
performing authority. 
 
2.2.8.2. Frequency of hazard rating exercise  
 
Depending on the legal requirements as well as the purpose for which the system is used, the 
frequency at which the rating exercise is conducted varies, as shown in Figure 8. Consequently, some 
of the responses confirmed that the authorities conduct the exercise annually whereas others only 
conduct the exercise after an inspection. 
 
In terms of the frequency of the hazard rating exercise, for the majority of respondents (6 or 35%) 
the exercise is conducted annually. Five respondents (29%) confirmed that authorities perform an 
analysis following inspections. According to a number of other respondents (3 or 18%), the exercise 
is not conducted at specific intervals but ratings are updated on an ongoing basis. The Czech 
Republic indicated that the evaluation was conducted once every 5 years. 
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      Figure 8: Frequency by which the hazard rating exercise is conducted (N=17) 
 
Analysis of the individual responses reveals the following points: 
 In Norway, the new system would be used for annual inspections. The inspectors can do an 
evaluation of recommended frequencies in between inspections.  
 In the Czech Republic, the hazard rating exercise is being performed in every 5 years for 
evaluating of the Safety Reports. 
 The Belgian RRT system for scheduling inspections purpose is applied when an establishment 
comes under the scope of the Seveso Directive. The exercise is also conducted if in case the 
establishment is modified, at which time the new rating uses information from the safety report.  
 In Switzerland, because of limited personal resources in the cantons, they had the objectives to 
develop criteria which reflect inspection intervals depending on the hazard potential of the 
establishments and not a fix inspection rhythm.  
 
2.2.8.3. Structural elements of the hazard rating systems 
 
All of the 18 respondents answered this question. Figure 9 (see below) shows which structural 
elements are most frequently used in hazard rating systems, as identified by the respondents. Table 
10 shows the individual responses associated with the different structural elements. From Figure 9 
and Table 10 it becomes clear that fifteen respondents’ hazard rating systems (88%) use the type 
and quantity of hazardous substances as an element in their ranking system (with one respondent 
indicating that this element is used exclusively). Most of these systems also consider exposure to 
potentially affected populations, property and environment (possible risk recipients) such as 
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residential areas, natural sites, etc. (11 out of 17), and production or process conditions (12 out of 
17). Many systems (ranging between 4 to 9 out of 17) also include one or more of the following 
elements: Seveso classification of the site; inspection records or compliance history; accident or near 
miss history; history of public complaints; installation design; safety culture elements; operator 
audits and assessments; enforcement records; or standardised hazard rating methodology. 
 
 
 
Figure 9: Frequency of use of structural elements in hazard rating systems (N=17) 
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Table 10: Elements examined in the respondents’ hazard rating systems 
Elements  Responses Respondents 
Hazardous substances present  15 Belgium (RRT), Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, 
Finland, Germany, International (WRI), 
Kyrgyzstan, Norway, Poland, Serbia, Sweden, 
Switzerland, United Kingdom, Ukraine 
Possible risk recipients 11 Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Finland, 
Germany, Norway, Poland, Sweden, Switzerland, 
Serbia, United Kingdom 
Production or process conditions  12 Belgium (RRT), Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, 
Finland, Germany, Norway, Poland, Serbia, 
Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom  
Seveso classification of the site 9 Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Finland, 
Germany, Norway, Poland, Serbia, Sweden 
Accident and near miss history 9 Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Finland, 
Norway, Poland, Serbia, Sweden, Switzerland 
Enforcement records and compliance 
history 
8 Bulgaria, Croatia, Finland, Norway, Poland, 
Serbia, Sweden, Switzerland  
Inspection records or compliance 
history 
8 Bulgaria, Croatia, Finland, Norway, Poland, 
Serbia, Sweden, Switzerland 
Installations design, maintenance and 
ageing 
7 Bulgaria, Finland, Poland, Serbia, Sweden, 
Switzerland, United Kingdom 
Natural phenomena that could lead to 
an accident  
6 Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Norway, Serbia, 
Sweden, United Kingdom 
Size of the site  5 Bulgaria, Norway, Serbia, Sweden, United 
Kingdom 
History of public complaints 5 Bulgaria, Croatia, Poland, Serbia, Sweden 
Standardised hazard rating system or 
methodology 
4 Belgium (RRT), Czech Republic, Poland, 
Switzerland 
Operator audits or self-assessments 4 Bulgaria, Finland, Poland, Serbia 
Safety culture elements 4 Bulgaria, Croatia, Finland, Switzerland 
Numeric performance rating from 
inspections or  
other type of evaluation 
2 Bulgaria, Sweden 
Other 4 Belgium (LOPI), Republic of Moldova, Norway, 
Poland  
N= 17  
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The Belgian LOPI system is qualitative and driven mainly by responses to specific questions based on 
specific information provided by the site. The Republic of Moldova indicated that all elements for 
rating exercise are at the discretion of the authorities. Poland mentioned equipment against the 
environmental pollution as another structural element of their system.  
 
2.2.8.4. Data evaluation 
 
Different techniques are used for evaluating the data, as shown in Table 11(see below). Most 
respondents (13 out of 15) assigned indicators to objective data. Four respondents also used 
indicators or qualitative rankings developed either from qualitative analysis or from operator 
questionnaires, as a data evaluation technique for their respective systems. In a few cases, data 
generated from a commercial software programme was also found to be used for the purpose of 
evaluation. Figure 10 (see below) is a graphic depiction of the extent to which different methods are 
applied for evaluations across 15 different systems. 
 
Table 11: Methods used for data evaluation 
Evaluation techniques  Responses Respondents 
Indicators are assigned to objective 
data  
13 Belgium (RRT), Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, 
Finland, Germany, International (WRI), 
Kyrgyzstan, Serbia, Sweden, Switzerland, United 
Kingdom, Ukraine 
Indicators or qualitative rankings 
developed from qualitative analysis 
4 Bulgaria, Finland, Sweden, Switzerland 
Indicators or qualitative rankings 
developed from operator 
questionnaire  
4 Finland, Serbia, Sweden, Switzerland 
Indexes used for interpretation 2 Belgium (RRT), Switzerland 
Some data are generated using a 
commercial software programme 
2 Czech Republic, Sweden  
The final result of the hazard rating 
is produced using a commercial 
software programme 
2 Belgium (RRT), Czech Republic 
Some data are generated using a 
commercial software programme 
1 Serbia 
Other algorithms used for 
interpretation 
2 Poland, Belgium (LOPI) 
N=15 
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As another example, the Belgian LOPI system based its final result on observations (positive or 
negative ones) during inspection (and documented in inspection reports). The purpose is to make 
some of the written data in the reports usable for statistical analysis and producing overviews. The 
LOPI are a 'layer' on top of the inspection reports, but are by no means a replacement of them. They 
are not proactively communicated to the companies. In Poland, it is an excel-based application. In 
Serbia, the ALOHA software programme is used for evaluating releases of hazardous chemicals 
vapours, including toxic gas clouds, fires, and explosions.  
 
 
Figure 10: Methods used for data evaluation in percentage (N=15) 
 
2.2.8.5. Type of output 
 
As indicated in Figure 11 (see below), the final output of the system may be a set of numeric 
indicator(s) or alternatively, a qualitative classification. In addition, four systems also include specific 
recommendations for the site as an outcome. For over half of the systems (9 out of 16), the final 
output was at least composed of a numeric indicator or indicators. Also, nearly half (7 out of 16) 
applied a qualitative classification. The systems described by Bulgaria and Sweden are designed to 
produce all three types of output. 
 
As an example, the Belgian RRT system output consists of three categories based on the numeric 
F&ET indicator. As another example, the Belgian LOPI system has at present 26 LOPI for each site. 
For each LOPI there are 5 possible outcomes and the default option 'not evaluated'. Although it is 
technically possible to combine these 26 qualitative indicators from a single site into a numerical 
score, but the authority has no intentions to do this. However, the authority can produce statistics 
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for each LOPI, e.g. how many sites test their safety instrumented functions periodically, and they 
have a (quick) overview of the LOPI for each site. This type of output seems currently to be more 
meaningful than a numeric score or a vague qualification of ‘bad’, 'good' etc. Also, in Switzerland, 
the result of the system is also a qualitative classification of the establishments with a recommended 
inspection frequency. 
 
 
      Figure 11: Output of the system (N=14) 
 
2.2.8.6. Distribution of results of the rating system 
 
According to the survey respondents, in the majority of cases (12 or 80%), the lead authority (i.e., 
the respondent’s authority) formally receives a copy of the results of the hazard rating exercise (see 
Figure 12 below). Eight respondents (53%) confirmed that other authorities receive the results and 
in nine countries the operator receives a copy of the results (60%). According to six respondents 
(40%), the results are made available upon request. 
  
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
Numeric indicator(s) Qualitative classification Specific recommendation for
the site
Belgium (RRT), Bulgaria,
Czech Republic, Finland,
International (WRI),
Kyrgyzstan, Poland, Sweden,
United Kingdom
Belgium (LOPI), Bulgaria,
Czech Republic,  Germany,
Republic of Moldova, Serbia,
Switzerland, Sweden
Bulgaria, Finland, Serbia,
Sweden
R
es
p
o
n
se
 %
 
 An Overview of Methodologies for Hazard Rating of Industrial Sites 41 
 
 
 Figure 12: Recipients receiving a formal copy of results (N=15) 
 
Table 12: Recipients receiving a formal copy of results 
Recipients Responses Respondents 
Respondent’s Authority  12 Belgium (RRT), Belgium (LOPI), Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech 
Republic, Finland, Kyrgyzstan, Poland, Serbia, Ukraine, 
Switzerland, United Kingdom 
Other authorities  8 Belgium (RRT), Czech Republic, Germany, International 
(WRI), Kyrgyzstan, Ukraine, Serbia, Sweden 
The operator 9 Belgium (RRT), Croatia, Czech Republic, Finland, Germany, 
Kyrgyzstan, Ukraine, Switzerland, United Kingdom 
Results are made 
available upon request 
6 Belgium (RRT), Finland, International (WRI), Kyrgyzstan, 
Ukraine, Sweden 
The public - Results are 
published online 
5 Czech Republic, International (WRI), Serbia, United 
Kingdom, Ukraine 
Other  2 Sweden, United Kingdom 
N=15  
 
An analysis of the individual responses (shown in Table 12 above) reveals the following points: 
 The Belgian LOPI system - Communication of the results outside the respondent’s authority is 
optional. In addition, the system has been in place since January 2012, so the data are not yet 
extensive or developed enough for external use.  
 Bulgaria - Priorities are set using the outcome of the risk assessment. The period between two 
site visits is based on a systematic appraisal of the environmental risks of the installations 
concerned and does not exceed one year for installations posing the highest risks and two years 
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for installations posing the lowest risks. If an inspection has identified an important case of non-
compliance with the permit conditions, an additional site visit is carried out. 
 UK - Relevant site data is also shared with certain trade bodies to help them determine priorities 
and influence their relevant sector base/membership. The methodology is published on the HSE 
website (http://www.hse.gov.uk/comah/guidance/site-prioritisation-methodology.pdf)  
 In Sweden it is the County Administrative Board who formally receives the result of the hazard 
rating system. 
 
2.2.9. Accessibility of the methodologies of the hazard rating systems 
 
Accessibility of the systems was evaluated in terms of availability to the hazard rating methodology 
to the public as well as to other UNECE countries, the availability of IT and web-based tools and the 
language in which the system is available. In the following sections, the responses are analysed. 
 
2.2.9.1. Availability of the hazard rating methodology to the public  
 
It is understood that as part of some hazard rating systems, the methodology of the particular 
system is published in order to make it available to the public, while under other systems it is made 
available upon written request only. From Figure 13 (below), it can be interpreted that eight 
respondents (53%) mentioned that their respective system is made available to the public only upon 
a written request or following the established legal process in regard to public access to information. 
In contrast, five respondents (33%) indicated that their system is published online for public. Norway 
also mentioned that their system will probably be published online. Table 13 shows the degree of 
availability of each rating system covered in the survey. 
 
 
 
      Figure 13: Availability to the public (N=15)  
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Table 13: Availability to the public 
Availability Responses Respondents 
Yes, Upon request  8 Belgium (RRT), Belgium (LOPI), Bulgaria, Germany, 
Finland, Sweden, Switzerland, Ukraine 
Yes, Published online 5 Czech Republic, International (WRI), Serbia, United 
Kingdom, Ukraine 
No, Not available  1 Poland 
Other 1 Norway 
N= 15 
 
2.2.9.2. Sharing the methodology with UNECE member countries 
 
To understand the degree of accessibility of the system, the respondents were also asked to express 
their willingness to share the details with other UNECE member countries. Almost all the 
respondents agreed to share the details of their respective system (Figure 14, below). Furthermore, 
Norway mentioned that when the system will be finished, it would be willing to share the details 
with UNECE member countries, and confirmed that the project report would be available in the 
English language. Czech Republic mentioned that the materials are available in Czech only.  
 
 
               Figure 14: Willingness to share details with UNECE countries (N=14) 
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2.2.9.3. Availability of IT or web-based tools  
 
With regard to accessibility of the system to the public, availability of an IT or web-based tool based 
on the methodology of the system, would be an additional advantage. Hence the respondents were 
asked to mention the availability of any IT or web-based tools, based on the hazard rating system.  
 
From Figure 15 (below), it can be understood that most of the respondents do not have an IT or 
web-based tool for their hazard rating systems. Of the two Belgian systems, the RRT system has a 
web-based tool based on the hazard rating methodology, whereas the LOPI system does not.  
 
 
  Figure 15: Availability of IT or web-based tools (N=14) 
 
Belgium also commented that the LOPI are integrated into the database application used to manage 
all data on Seveso establishments, e.g., data on inspections, data on installations (such as the Rapid 
Ranking Technique (RTT) ranking), identification data etc. The database allows linking an evaluation 
(the evaluation of a specific LOPI for a specific company) with one or more 'observations' made 
during inspection (inspection reports are essentially a combination of 'observations').  
 
At any time, the database software can generate an overview of the LOPI for an individual company, 
a group of establishments (e.g. upper tier, lower tier) or for all Seveso establishments. These 
evaluations are also possible for a certain point in time in order to show the change in LOPI over 
time. Since the evaluations are dated, the status of the LOPI can be produced for any moment in 
time since the start of the system.  
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2.2.9.4. Languages of the system or methodology 
 
The language in which the system is available is an important aspect for assessing the accessibility of 
the methodology of the hazard rating system. Most of the hazards rating systems (13 or 87%) are 
available in the national language(s). As shown in Figure 16 (below), the systems of three 
respondents are also available in English in addition to their respective national language. National 
languages of the respondents include: Czech (in Czech Republic), Dutch (in Belgium), English (in the 
UK), Finnish (in Finland), French (in Belgium and Switzerland), German (in Germany and Switzerland), 
Kyrgyz (in Kyrgyzstan), Norwegian (in Norway), Polish (in Poland), Swedish (in Sweden) and Ukrainian 
(in Ukraine), Bulgaria and Serbia did not mention the specific language. Kyrgyzstan mentioned that 
their system would also be available in the Russian language.  
 
 
Figure 16: Language(s) of the hazard rating systems (N=15) 
 
2.2.10. Strengths and weaknesses of the systems 
 
In the previous section, the existing hazard rating systems were evaluated from different aspects 
including structure, outputs, availability to the public, language etc. These analysis highlighted many 
important aspects of the hazard rating systems that they have or have not. Nevertheless, in order to 
escalate any system profile, it is of utmost importance to evaluate its strengths and weaknesses of if 
any. Accordingly, respondents were asked to provide their viewpoint on certain aspects regarding 
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their experience with the hazard rating system, including validation of the system (if any), history of 
modifications, effectiveness, transparency, and ease of application etc. These questions were asked 
in order to obtain a perspective on the perceived the strengths and weaknesses of the systems. In 
the following sections, each of these aspects were analysed individually.  
 
2.2.10.1. System validation by independent external experts  
 
In order to understand the capability of system as its strength, the respondents were asked to 
express their viewpoint by saying whether the system is ever validated independently by external 
experts or not. Six respondents (40%) confirmed that their systems had been validated by external 
experts, seven (47%) indicated that their system had never been validated by an external expert, and 
the rest of the respondents (2 or 13%) did not confirm this aspect. 
In regard to validation of the system by independent experts, four respondents provided further 
detailed information (Figure 17, see below). The Czech Republic mentioned that their system was 
evaluated through the discussion with independent experts and scientific institutions. While in 
Poland, it was audited during the IMPEL review. Sweden mentioned that the Swedish Contingencies 
Agency evaluates the County Administrative Board regulatory programs through supervisory 
guidance. In Switzerland, validation of the system was conducted through an independent 
assessment of the methodology by a company that carries out ISO certifications. The Belgian RRT 
system was first developed by TNO in the Netherlands based on the Dow Fire & Explosion Index and 
published subsequently by the ILO (International Labour Office) in its Major Hazard Control - a 
practical manual (Geneva, 1988, ISBN 92-2-106432-8). 
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      Figure 17: Independent validation of the system conducted (N=15) 
 
2.2.10.2. Updates and modifications over time 
 
Updating or modification of the system over time is considered to be another important issue for 
comprehending the strength of the system. The responses indicated that in eight respondents (out 
of 15) there has been an effort to modify or update the system over time (Figure 18, see below). In 
two countries, Switzerland and Serbia, it is not surprising that the systems have not yet been 
modified or updated because they have been in use for less than three years. Two respondents did 
not respond to the question. Figure 18 shows the update status of the systems by different 
respondents. 
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      Figure 18: Update or modification conducted since initial system launch (N=15) 
 
In Finland, the topics which are estimated have been changed slightly. The supporting example list of 
maters which may indicate particular number has been revised. The revision was based on 
inspector’s opinions what could be better procedure and might reflect better situation in an 
establishment. The WRI system has also been modified for the heterogeneous mixtures potentially 
spilled into waters, like fire-prevention waters, slurry, suspended ashes, and not-specified oils. In 
Switzerland, the system developed in 2012. At the moment a revision is being conducted by the 
MAO with an aim to strengthen the inspection of the establishments. After the revised MAO is 
brought into force in 2015, and would like to make a guideline for the hazard rating for inspections 
based on the report attached to this survey. In UK, the system was modified in 2010 to include 
environmental hazards in the rating scheme for consideration alongside intrinsic safety hazard.  
 
2.2.10.3. Effectiveness in achieving the purpose  
 
Effectiveness, another parameter to evaluate the strength of the system, was evaluated in terms of 
how the system could be useful for pursuing or fulfilling the purpose for which the system was 
developed. Accordingly respondents were asked to provide their opinion on the system according to 
the level of satisfaction with its performance in relation to its assigned objectives over time.  
 
Figure 19 (see below) shows that five respondents (38%) are ‘satisfied’ with their system’s 
effectiveness. Three respondents (23%) said that they were even ‘very satisfied’ with their system in 
its ability to achieve the intended purpose. However, five respondents (38%) chose only the ‘neutral’ 
option. Nonetheless, no respondent expressed dissatisfaction with its hazard rating system.  
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    Figure 19: Opinion on effectiveness of the system (N=13) 
 
Table 14: Opinion on the effectiveness of the system  
Opinion Responses Respondents10 
Very Satisfied  3 International (WRI), Switzerland, United Kingdom 
Satisfied 5 Belgium (RRT), Bulgaria, Finland, Germany, Poland 
Neutral 5 Belgium (LOPI), Czech Republic, Serbia, Sweden, Ukraine  
Unsatisfied 0 None 
Very unsatisfied 0 None 
N= 13 
 
Regarding the two Belgian systems, the respondent reported being ‘satisfied’ with the RRT system 
since it reflects the hazard potential of a site for fire/explosion and human toxicity very well (Table 
14, above). However, the system does not include an evaluation of the hazard potential for the 
environment (eco-toxicity). The environmental inspectorates in Belgium are currently examining 
methodologies for the (separate) evaluation of the eco-toxic hazard, linked to the implementation of 
the Seveso III Directive. In contrast, satisfaction with the LOPI system was categorised as ‘neutral’, 
because the system was developed only in 2012 and actual implementation started in January 2013. 
Hence, it is too early to comment on the system’s effectiveness. 
 
Other respondents also provided additional reflections beyond their opinion. The respondent from 
Germany mentioned that in case of their system it could possibly be improved with the addition of 
some criteria, such as operator performance, safety culture and effectiveness of maintenance 
practices, etc. However, it could be also that adding such criteria could make the rating system more 
                                                          
10
 Norway mentioned not applicable. 
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complicated and not necessarily more effective. The UK respondent observed that their system 
provides a simple, objective but sensitive scheme for rating sites based on intrinsic safety and 
environmental factors. It is used across the competent authority to prioritise allocation of resource 
and provide assurance that regulator resource is properly targeted and proportionate to risk. It was 
also commented that the international WRI system has been established as an orientation scheme. 
For this reason, there was no need to adjust it over the last 20 years, thereby the respondent could 
indicate being ‘very satisfied’ with its effectiveness.  
 
2.2.10.4. Ease of application 
 
Ease of applying the system was taken into account as the fourth parameter to evaluate the system’s 
strength. Hence, the respondents were requested to rate the system in terms of ease of application 
using a scale of ‘extremely good’ to ‘extremely poor’. As can be noted from Figure 20 (below), five 
respondents (36%) rated their system as ‘extremely good’ in this regard while four respondents 
(29%) indicated that the ease of application is ‘somewhat good’. Notably, no respondent selected 
‘somewhat poor’ or ‘extremely poor’ in regards to the ease of application of their system. Table 15 
(see below) indicates the responses in correspondence with each rating system. 
 
 
 Figure 20: Opinion on ease of application (N=13) 
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Table 15: Opinion on ease of application  
Opinion Responses Respondents11 
Extremely good  5 Belgium (RRT), Bulgaria, International (WRI), Switzerland, United 
Kingdom 
Somewhat good 4 Czech Republic, Germany, Poland, Sweden 
Neutral 4 Belgium (LOPI), Finland, Serbia, Ukraine 
Somewhat poor 0 None 
Extremely poor 0 None 
N= 13 
 
In the case of the international WRI system, the ease of application was reported as ‘extremely 
good’ For this system, the applicant is expected to require the water risk class of the substance as 
available online and the quantity of the spilled substance in the case of an accident or just the 
capacity in the case of doing an inventory. Then the result would one number which makes it easy to 
compare it with other incidents.  
 
Interestingly, two different assessments on ease of application were given for the Belgian systems. It 
was commented that the RRT system is an established methodology based on objective and easily 
accessible properties of dangerous substances and objective process parameters. However, the LOPI 
system requires an additional effort from the inspector in addition to writing reports and performing 
other enforcement actions. The LOPI system requires also some discipline to update the LOPI 
continuously as new inspection reports become available. For this system to work it is essential to 
have a good database of inspection reports and the possibility to establish links in an easy way 
between the reports and the LOPI evaluations. 
 
The Czech Republic mentioned that the use of the system requires the support of qualified experts. 
Switzerland pointed out two dimensions to the system in this regard. One dimension consists of 
quantitative aspects incorporated in the estimation of possible damage to the population or the 
environment based on a worst case scenario. In addition, there are soft criteria, for example, the 
operator’s performance in managing site risks based on the opinion of the inspector.  
 
2.2.10.5. Transparency of the results 
 
Transparency of the system is essentially the level of interpretation that is required to understand 
the result. It may be that some systems require guidance to interpret results while others may not. 
Moreover, some systems may not only require a guided interpretation but also possibly some 
training in order to understand the result more clearly.  
                                                          
11
 Norway mentioned not applicable. 
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On the basis of a number of responses (as captured in Figure 21, below), the systems of Bulgaria, 
Germany, Poland and Ukraine could be identified as ‘very transparent system’ since the correct 
interpretation of the system output does not require any further guidance. The systems including 
the Belgian RRT, Finland, Sweden, Switzerland as well as UK, can be labelled as ‘medium transparent’ 
as the interpretation of their results require some level of guidance; whereas the systems like 
Belgian LOPI, Czech republic, Republic of Moldova and Serbia as ‘least transparent’ since the correct 
interpretation requires a lot of guidance and training.  
 
 
Figure 21: Transparency of the system results (N = 14) 
 
The respondent from the UK mentioned in this regard that there is difficulty in equating numerical 
values for intrinsic safety hazard with values for environmental hazard, i.e. can we compare the 
value of human safety and environmental safety on the same scale? The methodology obtains 
separate values for safety and environmental hazards which are presented as two separate 
components rather than incorporating them within one single linear rating scheme. The rating 
system is less sensitive to the variety of sites where environmental hazard is a dominant feature. 
These sites tend to be defined within site type 'other' for which the model and scoring system is not 
sufficiently sensitive to separate out variation in hazard across the full range. 
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2.2.11. Suitability of the results for risk communication to the public 
 
The use of the results of the systems for communicating risk to the public may also serve as an 
indicator to evaluate the systems strengths or weaknesses. Some respondents indicated the use of 
outputs as a basis for public communication, while some countries do not. In order to summarise 
this aspect, the respondents were requested to express their views in terms of ‘agree’ or ‘disagree‘.  
 
 
 
   Figure 22: Suitability of output for risk communication (N=14) 
 
 
Table 16: Use of output for risk communication 
Opinion  Responses Respondents 
Strongly agree 3 International (WRI), Republic of Moldova, United Kingdom 
Agree 7 Belgium (LOPI), Bulgaria, Germany, Serbia, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Ukraine  
Neither agree or disagree 3 Belgium (RRT), Czech Republic, Poland 
Disagree 1 Finland 
Strongly disagree 0 None 
N= 14 
 
A majority of respondents (10 out of 14, or 71%) agreed or agreed strongly that the output could be 
used for risk communication to the public (as shown in Figure 22 and Table 16 above). However, it 
must be emphasised that the opinion was that of the individual respondent rather than the official 
view of their competent authority. In fact, the validity of the use of the output has not been widely 
tested in practice. As shown in Table 13 above, only five respondents indicated that the data is 
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automatically published online. Nonetheless, it is interesting to note that a good number of the 
respondents t were favourable to the idea of using hazard ratings to help the public in forming their 
perceptions of risk in regard to individual major hazard sites. 
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3. Conclusions 
 
The survey responses showed that hazard rating systems for major hazard sites are relatively 
common among European countries and their neighbours. Several respondents indicated 
considerable experience with rating systems while others have only been operating for a short time. 
A few respondents also noted plans to introduce a new rating system or modify the current one. 
Also, one respondent reported on a system used to support international conventions (the 
Convention on the International Commission for the Protection of the Elbe and the Convention on 
the International Commission for the Protection of the Oder) that also offers relevant input to this 
study. 
 
Not surprisingly, the respondents of EU/EEA countries were by far the most represented in the 
survey responses because of the country’s legal obligation to use an appraisal system for scheduling 
Seveso Directive inspections. However, it was encouraging to note that several respondents from 
non-EU countries were also operating or planning to operate hazard rating systems for their major 
hazard sites, and their comments generally showed an appreciation of the usefulness of such 
systems as a policy implementation instrument.  
 
The survey responses also provided a rich source of information on different approaches to hazard 
rating systems. On the one hand, survey responses indicated a substantial commonality in terms of 
purpose and use, availability and design among the rating systems. On the other hand, individual 
systems also stood out for their differences. Two systems, in particular, the Belgian LOPI system and 
the International River Basin Commissions system, were of a slightly different character than the 
others. Moreover, while respondents identified a number of strengths and weaknesses associated 
with their systems, in general it appeared that, in the opinion of respondents, the systems 
functioned adequately if not extremely well in meeting their various purposes. The following 
paragraphs summarise the main conclusions in this regard. 
 
3.1. Purpose and use  
 
In terms of purpose and use, the responses allowed for the following conclusions to be drawn: 
 A sizeable proportion of countries have given a certain level of authority to their hazard 
rating methodologies, either as part of legislation or as official national guidance. 
 The principal users of the hazard rating systems are the competent authorities, and of these, 
the inspectorates were by far the largest group of users. 
 The systems are used mostly for evaluating operator performance and for scheduling 
inspections or other enforcement purposes. 
 A few systems also used the results from the hazard rating systems for planning future policy 
strategy and identifying safety trends. 
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Notably, the international WRI system used by the International River Basin Authorities is the only 
system not associated with inspections and enforcement. It is primarily a system designed for 
prevention and preparedness interventions and policy development. 
 
In addition, there was no particular commonality between the systems in terms of how the 
frequency of their application was defined. A little over a third of the respondents generally applied 
the system to a site following an inspection. For the other systems, frequency was fairly evenly 
divided in terms of being either ongoing, continuous or based on other criteria.   
 
3.2. Availability of hazard rating methodologies 
 
From the point of view of transparency and co-operation, the responses regarding the availability of 
hazard rating methodologies were quite promising. Most of the hazard rating methodologies can be 
obtained from the relevant sources, either by accessing the publication on the internet or upon 
request. Nearly all the respondents specifically indicated their willingness to share the hazard rating 
methodologies with other UNECE countries. However, it should be noted that the availability of 
methodologies in user-friendly IT or web-based form is often limited. Also, most methodologies are 
not available in English. Perhaps these obstacles present an opportunity for future mutual 
collaboration to reduce the barriers to countries in obtaining information on the methodologies and 
applying them, particular for those countries who seek to establish or improve their approaches. 
 
3.3. Common design elements 
 
The key design features of hazard rating systems are the criteria used for evaluation, the evaluation 
method, and the type of output. In this regard, the survey responses highlighted the following: 
 Most hazard rating methodologies are developed by a task force and/or based on existing 
scientific knowledge. At minimum all hazard rating systems rely on measurable criteria and 
objective data (i.e., hazardous substances present, Seveso classification, process conditions and 
types, size of the site).  
 The type and quantity of hazardous substances present was the most common structural 
element used in all systems in which information on criteria was provided by respondents. In 
addition, a number of hazard rating systems use qualitative rankings and indices, such as history 
of public complaints, performance rating following an inspection, etc. 
 The final evaluation could be numeric (an indicator or indicators), a qualitative ranking, 
descriptive (i.e., recommendations), or a combination of these elements.  
 To perform the evaluations, it appeared that there is not much reliance on commercial software 
programme according to respondents. 
 An Overview of Methodologies for Hazard Rating of Industrial Sites 57 
 
3.4. Strengths and weaknesses 
 
In general, most users of the hazard rating systems seem to be content with the performance of the 
system. Approximately, half of the hazard rating methodologies have been reviewed and updated 
after having been used for some years. It was also interesting to note that:  
 Most users of the hazard rating methodologies rate them as relatively easy to use, although the 
interpretation of the results often requires some expertise and guidance.  
 Most respondents considered that the outputs of their hazard rating methodologies could be 
suitable for risk communication to the public. 
 
3.5. Final observations  
 
The survey responses show that use of hazard rating systems is generally considered a value-added 
mechanism for implementation of major accident prevention and preparedness policy in many 
UNECE countries. The respondents remain satisfied to ‘very satisfied’ with the results provided by 
the system, suggesting that they are credible and have proven to be valid over time. For this reason, 
this document should be an encouraging input to countries or international organisations which 
have not yet established their own rating systems but are considering it. Indeed, a number of 
countries are already in a phase of transition, that is, they are well along a path to establish a new 
system, either for the first time, or to replace an outdated one.  
 
Based on the survey, all respondents are open to providing more detailed information on their 
system and experience with it to other UNECE competent authorities. Contact information is listed in 
Annex 2 of this report. 
 
It is also known that a few countries (France, the Netherlands) who have established hazard rating 
systems were not able to respond to the survey in the given time frame due to the temporary 
unavailability of a competent expert in the system. However, based on exchanges with these 
countries, it is expected that they will also be interested to join and offer their knowledge and 
experience to other UNECE countries should an opportunity arise in future. 
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4. Annex 1: Case studies for selected hazard rating systems 
 
CASE STUDY 1: UNITED KINGDOM 
SITE PRIORITISATION METHODOLOGY, INTRINSIC HAZARD (SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENT) AND 
PERFORMANCE  
 
1. GENERAL DESCRIPTION 
 
OWNER (S):  National COMAH Competent Authority12. 
USERS:  National COMAH Competent Authority. Relevant site data is also shared 
with certain trade bodies to help them determine priorities and influence 
their relevant sector base or membership. 
LEGAL STATUS:  Official guidance, but not incorporated in legislation. 
GUIDANCE AVAILABLE: Yes 
IT TOOL EXISTS:  No 
LANGUAGE(S):   English 
 
HOW TO OBTAIN A COPY OF THE METHODOLOGY: 
Guidance available at http://www.hse.gov.uk/comah/guidance/site-prioritisation-methodology.pdf  
 
2. OVERVIEW OF THE HAZARD RATING METHODOLOGY 
 
SCOPE:    All Seveso sites covered 
PURPOSE(S):  Inspection scheduling, evaluating individual operator performance, deciding 
on themes of future inspections, evaluating the effectiveness of 
enforcement, planning future policy strategy, identifying safety performance 
trends.  
WHEN IS IT APPLIED: Annually 
CRITERIA (INPUTS):  Hazardous substances present, possible risk recipients, production or 
process conditions, installations design, maintenance and ageing 
 
EVALUATION METHODOLOGY: 
Prioritisation is based on the intrinsic site hazard and the performance of the site in managing major 
hazard risks. The hazard ranking methodology has two elements:  
                                                          
12
 The regulatory body for the Control of Major Accident Hazards Regulations 1999 includes the Health and 
Safety Executive (HSE) working jointly with the respective Environment Agencies of England, Scotland and 
Wales. 
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a. A simple safety ranking scheme assigns numbers to ‘unchanging’ features about the site and the 
surrounding area. The site is given a base score that describes the main activity/type of site, 
which is then multiplied by a factor that reflects the density of the local population. Where the 
site presents a high ‘societal’ risk another multiplying factor is applied.  
b. The environmental rating system works in a very similar way: Numbers are attached to site type 
and multiplied by ‘pathway’ and ‘sensitivity’ factors to give the ‘environmental’ ranking score.  
 
The safety and environmental scores are then combined to give an overall CA score/rank for the site. 
This remains relatively static, changing only when there are significant changes to inventories/ 
processes or the surrounding population/environment. All COMAH sites are thus assigned an 
intrinsic hazard score, ranked and assigned to one of four hazard bands which are used to influence 
regulatory activity, e.g., allocation of resources proportionate to the major accident risk, site 
complexity and regulatory history, consistent starting point for inspection planners, and assurance 
that resources are focused on priorities. 
 
FINAL OUTPUT:  Numeric 
 
The intrinsic hazard ranking is the final output and is then used to classify each site into one of four 
hazard bands which is then considered alongside individual site performance data to determine level 
and depth of regulatory activity. (Separately from this system, operators are also scored against a 
number of specific strategic priority topics. The scoring system is published and individual scores 
shared with the relevant operator). 
 
3. STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES 
 
EFFECTIVENESS RATING:   Very satisfied  
EASE OF APPLICATION:   Extremely good 
TRANSPARENCY OF RESULTS:  Correct interpretation requires some guidance  
 
The system provides a simple and objective but rather sensitive scheme for rating sites based on 
intrinsic safety and environmental factors.  
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CASE STUDY 2: SWEDEN 
SITE PRIORITISATION METHODOLOGY, INTRINSIC HAZARD (SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENT) AND 
PERFORMANCE 
 
1. GENERAL DESCRIPTION 
 
OWNER (S):  Seveso competent authorities 
USERS:  County Administrative Board (at regional level) 
LEGAL STATUS:  No 
GUIDANCE AVAILABLE: No 
IT TOOL EXISTS:  No 
LANGUAGE(S):   Swedish 
 
HOW TO OBTAIN A COPY OF THE METHODOLOGY:  
TBA during Member State review 
 
2. OVERVIEW OF THE HAZARD RATING METHODOLOGY 
 
SCOPE:    All Seveso sites covered 
PURPOSE(S):  Evaluating individual operator performance, deciding on themes for future 
inspections, planning future policy strategy 
WHEN IS IT APPLIED?  Both annually and after an inspection 
CRITERIA (INPUTS):  Hazardous substances present, the Seveso classification of the site, size of 
the site, production/process conditions, installation design and maintenance 
possible risk recipients, inspection records/compliance history, numeric 
performance rating from inspection, accident or near miss history, history of 
public compliance, natural phenomena that could lead to an accident.  
 
EVALUATION METHODOLOGY:  
Indicators are assigned to objective data, qualitative rankings are developed either from quantitative 
analysis or from operator questionnaire and some data are generated using a commercial software 
programme.  
In general, all parameters are weighted together to produce an overall assessment. The County 
Administrative Board (CAB) and the Swedish Work Environment Authority discusses the result to get 
a common view. Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency then follows up the CAB estimates through 
supervisory guidance.  
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FINAL OUTPUT:  Numeric indicator, qualitative classification and specific recommendations 
made for the site.  
 
3. STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES 
 
EFFECTIVENESS RATING:   Neutral 
EASE OF APPLICATION:   Somewhat good 
TRANSPARENCY OF RESULTS:  Correct interpretation requires some guidance 
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CASE STUDY 3: BELGIUM - RRT 
SITE PRIORITISATION METHODOLOGY, INTRINSIC HAZARD (SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENT) AND 
PERFORMANCE 
 
1. GENERAL DESCRIPTION 
 
OWNER (S):  All competent regional and federal Seveso inspection authorities  
USERS:  All competent regional and federal Seveso inspection authorities 
LEGAL STATUS:  Yes 
GUIDANCE AVAILABLE: Yes 
IT TOOL EXISTS:  Yes 
LANGUAGE(S):   Dutch and French 
 
HOW TO OBTAIN A COPY OF THE METHODOLOGY:  
TBA during Member State review 
 
2. OVERVIEW OF THE HAZARD RATING METHODOLOGY 
 
SCOPE:    All Seveso sites covered 
PURPOSE(S):  Inspection scheduling 
WHEN IS IT APPLIED?  Calculation is done when an establishment comes under the scope of the 
Seveso Directive. It is also actualized in case of modifications of the 
establishments and is verified during the examination of the safety report.  
CRITERIA (INPUTS):  Hazardous substances present, production or process conditions, a 
standardised hazard rating system or methodology  
 
EVALUATION METHODOLOGY:  
Indicators are assigned to objective data and indexes (e.g., Mond Index, FE&I, etc.) used for 
interpretation purpose.  
 
FINAL OUTPUT:  Numeric indicators 
 
The Rapid Ranking Technique (RRT) consists in the calculation of two indices: a Fire and Explosion 
Index, measuring the hazards related to fire and explosions and a Toxicity index, measuring the 
hazard related to toxicity. The calculation of these two indices takes account of the following:  
- the energy release potential of the hazardous substances involved; 
- the toxicity release potential of the hazardous substances involved; 
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- the general process hazards, related to the chemical reaction involved, handling of the 
chemicals; and 
- some specific process hazards related to process temperature, pressure and other process 
conditions.  
 
Based on the Fire & Explosion and Toxicity Index, establishments are categorised into three 
categories ranging from low hazardous to high hazardous. Each hazard category is linked to a 
minimum inspection frequency. For the lowest hazard potential category, the minimum inspection 
frequency is set at once every three years. For the highest hazard potential category, the minimum 
inspection frequency is set at once a year. For establishments only including simple processes such 
as storage activities and where no chemical reaction is involved, the minimum inspection frequency 
is decreased by one year (but never lower than once every three year).  
 
3. STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES 
 
EFFECTIVENESS RATING:   Satisfied 
EASE OF APPLICATION:   Extremely good 
TRANSPARENCY OF RESULTS:  Correct interpretation requires some guidance 
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CASE STUDY 4: BELGIUM - LOPI 
SITE PRIORITISATION METHODOLOGY, INTRINSIC HAZARD (SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENT) AND 
PERFORMANCE  
 
1. GENERAL DESCRIPTION 
OWNER (S):  The Seveso Inspection Authority of the Federal Public Service Employment, 
Labour and Social Dialogue 
USERS:  The Seveso inspection Authority of the Federal Public Service Employment, 
Labour and Social Dialogue 
LEGAL STATUS:  No 
GUIDANCE AVAILABLE: Yes 
IT TOOL EXISTS:  Yes 
LANGUAGE(S):   Dutch and French 
 
HOW TO OBTAIN A COPY OF THE METHODOLOGY: TBA during Member State review 
 
2. OVERVIEW OF THE HAZARD RATING METHODOLOGY 
SCOPE:    All Seveso sites covered 
PURPOSE(S):  Evaluating the effectiveness of enforcement, evaluating individual operator 
performance, identifying safety performance trends, deciding on themes of 
future inspections, planning future policy strategy,  
WHEN IS IT APPLIED?  After an inspection 
CRITERIA (INPUTS):  26 questions and observations whose findings are evaluated on a qualitative 
scale. 
 
EVALUATION METHODOLOGY:  
The 26 measures (or LOPI) are: - All safety instrumented functions (preventing major accidents) are 
identified and documented - For all safety instrumented functions the complete functionality is 
periodically tested - All pressure relief systems (on ‘major hazard equipment’) are properly sized - All 
safety valves are periodically maintained - Degradation of all envelopes (with ‘major hazard 
potential’) is being monitored - Periodic inspection of all secondary containment and draining 
systems - There is an explosion protection document (for the whole site) - For each installation there 
is a recent analysis of process upsets (e.g. HAZOP) (new LOPI since January 2014) - For each 
installation, the minimum staffing required to run the installation (safely) has been determined - The 
required initial formation is determined for all operational functions - For all operational manual 
actions written instructions are available - The company has identified the representative emergency 
scenarios and defined for each scenario the intervention strategy - The complete internal emergency 
plan is tested every three years - An emergency exercise with evacuation is held annually - All 
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emergency intervention equipment is inspected and maintained regularly - The minimum staffing of 
the internal emergency response team has been determined - All members of the internal 
emergency response team receive periodic training - Hot work is controlled by a work permit system 
- Works involving the opening of installations are controlled by a work permit system - Working in 
confined spaces is controlled by a work permit system - Checks are conducted on a regular basis to 
verify the correct application of the work permit system - Incidents and accidents process are 
internally reported and investigated - The actions resulting from the investigations of incidents and 
accidents are carried out - The actions resulting from the investigations of incidents and accidents 
are carried out - There is a reporting system that informs the manager about the functioning the 
process safety management system - All elements of the process safety management system are 
covered by an audit system Each LOPI is evaluated by the inspector responsible for the Seveso site.  
 
The evaluation is based on findings documented in one or more inspection report. The possible 
options for the evaluation of a LOPI are:  
• Investigated and no deficiencies observed  
• Not applicable  
• Unknown (not enough inspection findings available to make an evaluation) 
• Shortcomings have been identified - actions in execution  
• Shortcomings - no actions (this of course an unwanted situation requiring further 
enforcement). 
 
Communication of the results outside the respondent’s authority is of course an open option, but at 
present they have no need for this. In addition, the system is in place since January 2012, so the data 
are not sufficiently mature for external use.   
 
The LOPIs are evaluated on the basis of observations (positive and negative ones) during inspections 
(and documented in inspection reports). The idea of the system is to make some of the written data 
in the reports usable for statistical analysis and producing overviews. The LOPIs are a ‘layer’ on top 
of the inspection reports, but by no means a replacement of them. They are just not proactively 
communicated. 
 
In terms of an IT interface, the LOPI are integrated into the database application used to manage all 
data on Seveso etablishments companies, e.g., data on inspections, data on installations (such as the 
RTT), identification data etc. The database allows linking an evaluation (the evaluation of a specific 
LOPI for a specific company) with one or more 'observations' made during inspection (inspection 
reports are essentially a combination of 'observations').  
 
At any time, the database software can generate an overview of the LOPI for an individual company, 
a group of companies (e.g. upper tier, lower tier) or for all Seveso companies. These evaluations are 
also possible for a certain point in time in order to show the change in LOPI over time (since the 
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evaluations are dated, the status of the LOPI can be produced for any moment in time (since the 
start of the system)). This database also contains the RTT-ratings for each company. 
 
FINAL OUTPUT:  Qualitative indicator (LOPI) 
 
3. STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES 
EFFECTIVENESS RATING:   Neutral 
EASE OF APPLICATION:   Neutral 
TRANSPARENCY OF RESULTS: Correct interpretation requires a lot of guidance and 
possibly training 
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5. Annex 2: Copy of the survey 
 
Respondent’s details: 
 
1. Name of respondent  
2. Job Title  
3. Name and contact information of the organization 
4. Country  
 
Summary description of the hazard rating system or methodology:  
 
5. If your hazard rating system or methodology has a name, then kindly provide it in the space 
below. (If it is an acronym, it should be spelled out).  
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
6. What is the purpose of using the system? (Check all that apply) 
o For inspections scheduling only 
o For evaluating effectiveness of enforcement 
o For evaluating individual operator performance 
o For identifying safety performance trends 
o For deciding on themes of future inspections 
o For prioritizing other interventions (not inspections) 
o For planning future policy strategy 
o Other (Please specify) 
 
 
 
 
7. If you ticked in the before-mentioned question the reply "for prioritizing other interventions (not 
inspections)", then please specify below your reply. Should you not have ticked this reply, please 
proceed with the other questions. 
 
 
 
 
8. How was the hazard rating system or methodology developed? (Check one answer only) 
o A special committee or task force collaborated on its development 
o The system or methodology is the result of a specific research project 
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o The system or methodology is all or partly based on an existing system or methodology of 
another authority or country 
o The system or methodology (or part of it) was developed by a consultant 
o The system or methodology was all or partly based on information found in scientific 
literature 
o Other (Please specify) 
 
 
 
 
9.  If you ticked in the before-mentioned question the reply "based on an existing system or 
methodology of another authority or country", then please explain below your reply. Should you 
not have ticked this reply, please proceed with the other questions. 
 
 
 
 
 
10. What kind of establishments does the hazard rating system or methodology evaluate? (Check all 
that apply) 
o All Seveso sites 
o Upper tier Seveso sites only 
o Lower tier Seveso sites only 
o Specific economic activities (i.e. refineries) 
o Only sites covered by the UNECE Industrial Accidents Convention 
o Sites classified by other legislation 
o Other (Please specify) 
 
 
 
 
11. If you ticked in the before-mentioned question the reply either "specific economic activities (i.e. 
refineries)" or "sites classified by other legislation", then please explain below your reply. Should 
you not have ticked either of this reply, please proceed with the other questions. 
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12. What is the scope of the hazard rating system or methodology? (Check all that apply) 
o All operator requirements under the Seveso Directive 
o All operator requirements under the Industrial Accidents Convention 
o Some operator requirements under the Seveso Directive (Please list in the 'comments' 
section below) 
o Some operator requirements under the Industrial Accidents Convention (Please list in the 
'comments' section below) 
o Other themes in addition to the Seveso Directive and/or the Industrial Accidents Convention 
requirements (Please list in the 'comments' section below) 
 
Comments:  
 
 
 
13. Who is the principal user (e.g., national competent authority) of the results of the hazard rating 
system or methodology? 
 
 
 
 
14. Has the hazard rating system or methodology been formally adopted (e.g., in a legal act or 
guidance)? (Check one answer only) 
o Yes 
o No 
o Other (Please specify) 
 
 
 
15. How long has this hazard rating system or methodology been in use? 
 
 
 
16. Please give us any other 'additional information' that you think would be helpful to describe 
your hazard rating system or methodology more clearly. 
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Structure and outputs of hazard rating system or methodology 
 
17. How often do you conduct the hazard rating? (Check one answer only) 
o Annually 
o It is continuously used 
o After an inspection 
o Other (Please specify) 
 
 
 
 
18. Which authority (es) conducts or contributes to in the hazard rating exercise? (Check one answer 
only) 
o My authority leads the hazard rating exercise 
o Another authority leads the hazard rating exercise 
o Other authorities contribute data 
o Other authorities participate in evaluation of the data 
o Other (Please specify) 
 
 
 
 
19. If you ticked in the before-mentioned question the reply "another authority leads the hazard 
rating exercise", or "other authorities contribute data" or "other authorities participate in 
evaluation of the data", then please specify below your reply. Should you not have ticked this 
reply, please proceed with other questions. 
 
 
 
 
 
20. What structural elements are used as a basis for the hazard rating system or methodology? 
(Check all that apply) 
o Hazardous substances present (e.g., quantities, properties, etc.) 
o The Seveso classification of the site (upper or lower tier) 
o Size of the site (e.g., number of employee, production volume, etc.) 
o Production/process conditions (e.g., high pressures, high temperatures, number of 
loading/unloading operations, batch/continuous processes, etc.) 
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o A standardised hazard rating system or methodology (e.g., MOND Index, Dow FE&I, etc.) 
o Installations design, maintenance and ageing 
o Possible risk recipients (e.g., residential areas, public facilities, vulnerable nature sites, 
surface and ground water sources, agricultural land use, historical and cultural assets, etc.) 
o Natural phenomena that could lead to an accident (e.g., earthquakes, landslides, climate 
induced events, etc.) 
o Inspection records/compliance history (e.g., ratings, number of minor and major deficiencies 
etc.) 
o Enforcement records and compliance history (e.g., ratings, number of minor and major 
deficiencies, penalties and other legal interventions,) 
o Numeric performance rating from inspections or other type of evaluation (You may wish to 
explain this in the 'additional comments' at the end of this section) 
o Accident and near miss history 
o History of public complaints 
o Operator audits or self-assessments 
o Safety culture elements (e.g., indicators of management commitment, results of safety 
culture assessment) 
o Other (please specify) 
 
 
 
 
 
21. How are the data evaluated? (Check all that apply) 
o Indicators are assigned to objective data (e.g., type and quantity of hazardous substance, 
size of site, etc.) 
o Indicators or qualitative rankings (e.g., excellent, fair, poor) developed from qualitative 
analysis (e.g., of inspection reports, questionnaires completed by the operator, operator 
interviews etc.) 
o Indicators or qualitative rankings developed from operator questionnaire (e.g., questions 
posed to the operator during a site visit or on paper/electronically) 
o Indexes (e.g., MOND, FEI) used for interpretation 
o Some data are generated using a commercial software programme 
o Some data are generated using a commercial software programme (Please specify in the 
'comments' section below) 
o The final result of the hazard rating is produced using a commercial software programme. 
o Other algorithms used for interpretation (Please specify in the 'comments' section below) 
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Comments: 
 
 
 
 
22. Please explain briefly how the components mentioned in Q20 and Q21 are combined to produce 
an overall result. 
 
 
 
 
 
23. The result of the hazard rating exercise for each site is which of the following? (Check all that 
apply) 
o A numeric indicator or indicators (If more than one indicator, please indicate in the 
'comments' section below at what value each indicator is intended to represent) 
o A qualitative classification (e.g., excellent, fair, poor) (Please indicate in the 'comments' 
section below about how the classification works and how many classifications you use 
o Specific recommendations for the site (e.g., enforcement actions, safety improvements) 
 
Comments: 
 
 
 
 
 
24. Who is formally provided with the results of the hazard rating? (Check all that apply) 
o My authority 
o Other authorities (You may wish to explain this in the 'additional comments' at the end of 
this section) 
o The operator 
o The results are published online 
o The results are available to the public upon request 
o Other (Please specify) 
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25. Please give us any other information that you think would be helpful to describe the structure 
and outputs of your hazard rating system or methodology. 
 
 
 
 
 
Availability and access of the hazard rating system or methodology 
 
26. Is the hazard rating system or methodology available for the public? (Check one answer only) 
o Yes, it is published online. 
o Yes, upon written request. 
o No, it is not available. 
o Other (Please specify) 
 
 
 
 
 
27. Can the details of the hazard rating system or methodology be shared with another UNECE 
country if requested? (Check one answer only) 
o Yes 
o No 
o Other (Please specify) 
 
 
 
 
 
28. Are there any IT/interactive/web tools available that are based on the hazard rating system or 
methodology? (Check one answer only) 
o Yes 
o No 
o Other (Please specify) 
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29. In which language(s) is the hazard rating system or methodology available? (Check all the apply) 
o National languages(s) (Please specify in the 'comments' section below) 
o English 
o Russian 
Comments: 
 
 
 
 
30. Please give us any other information that you think would be helpful to understand the 
availability and access of your hazard rating system or methodology. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Strengths and weaknesses of the hazard rating system or methodology 
Please note that some of these questions may require you to use your own expert judgement. It 
would be very helpful if you could explain each answer briefly in the 'comments' section. 
 
31. Has the hazard rating system or methodology ever been modified over time? (Check one answer 
only) 
o Yes (If so, please explain in the 'comments' section below about how and why it was 
modified) 
o No 
o I don't know 
Comments:  
 
 
 
 
32. Has the hazard rating system or methodology ever been independently validated by an external 
expert(s) or audited? (Check one answer only) 
o Yes (If yes, please explain briefly in the 'comments' section below about how the validation 
was conducted) 
o No 
o I don't know 
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Comments:  
 
 
 
 
33. How would you rate the hazard rating system or methodology in terms of effectiveness in 
achieving the purpose identified in Section 3 describing the hazard rating system or 
methodology? (Check one answer only) 
o Very satisfied 
o Satisfied 
o Neutral 
o Unsatisfied 
o Very Unsatisfied 
Please explain your choice:  
 
 
 
 
 
34. How would you rate the hazard rating system or methodology in terms of ease of application 
(how easy is it to use and gather data)? (Check one answer only) 
o Extremely good 
o Somewhat good 
o Neutral 
o Somewhat poor 
o Extremely poor 
Please explain your choice:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
35. How would you rate the hazard rating system or methodology in terms of transparency of 
results/user friendliness/need for specialised training? (Check one answer only) 
o Correct interpretation does not require much guidance 
o Correct interpretation requires some guidance 
o Correct interpretation requires a lot of guidance and possibly training 
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36. Could the results of the hazard ranking be used effectively for risk communication to the public? 
(Check one answer only) 
o Strongly Agree 
o Agree 
o Neither agree nor disagree 
o Disagree 
o Strongly Disagree 
 
37. Please give us any other information that you think would be helpful to understand the 
strengths and weaknesses of your hazard rating system or methodology. 
 
 
 
 
Background materials  
 
38. It would be helpful to have some materials describing the hazard rating system or methodology 
and its results. Please check below if you are providing the following with this survey. 
o A copy of the description of the hazard rating system or methodology (regardless of the 
language in which it is available) 
o An example of results of the hazard ranking exercise 
 
As the materials cannot be attached to the survey, we would kindly ask EU / EFTA / EEA (i.e. Seveso) 
countries to send them to Ms. Anandita Sengupta (anandita.sengupta@jrc.ec.europa.eu) and non-
EU UNECE countries to Ms. Claudia Kamke (claudia.kamke@unece.org). 
 
39. There may be interest in preparing a more detailed case study of a few hazard rating system or 
methodologies from the responses to the survey. (Check all that apply) 
o If your system or methodology was found to be of interest, would you be willing to clarify 
some details and answer some further question from MAHB or UNECE (e.g. by conference 
call)? 
o Would you be willing to make a short presentation on your hazard rating system or 
methodology in the UNECE workshop or webinar if requested? 
 
40. If you have any other comments, please provide them here. 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
How to obtain EU publications 
 
Our publications are available from EU Bookshop (http://bookshop.europa.eu), 
where you can place an order with the sales agent of your choice. 
The Publications Office has a worldwide network of sales agents. 
You can obtain their contact details by sending a fax to (352) 29 29‐42758. 
 
Europe Direct is a service to help you find answers to your questions about the European Union Free phone 
number (*): 00 800 6 7 8 9 10 11 
*) Certain mobile telephone operators do not allow access to 00 800 numbers or these calls ay be billed. 
A great deal of additional information on the European Union is available on the Internet. It can be accessed 
through the Europa server http://europa.eu 
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